Product tour
See the platform, not a brochure.
Twelve screens from the running console, walked through point by point. These are real captures of the application against a demonstration environment — the interface is genuine, the estate inside it is invented.
Every hostname shown uses example.com and every address is documentation or private space. No customer data appears on this page.
Watch it end to end
Just under four minutes through the running console, captioned as it goes: the multi-customer view, discovery, findings and their evidence, the exposure graph, attack paths, assessment coverage, Fix First, Entra identity, RMM remediation, change detection, CMMC readiness, the monthly customer review and executive reporting.
Step 1
Start with the exposure picture
Not a feed of findings. Where the risk sits, which way it is moving, and what needs a person today.
- 1Overall risk score
A single number with a band, derived from the same named factors used on every finding.
- 2Findings by severity
Counts split by severity so the shape of the estate is visible at a glance.
- 3Trend over the period
Whether exposure is falling or rising, not just today's total.
Next: open the inventory behind these numbers, because a score is only as good as the estate it was computed over. the inventory →
Step 2
Everything you own, in one inventory
External surface, internal networks and endpoints land in the same inventory, each carrying the context prioritization depends on.
- 1Authorization state
Assessment only happens against assets explicitly marked authorized.
- 2Scope
Domains and addresses that define what is in bounds for this asset.
- 3Environment
Production and development are treated differently by scoring.
Next: what those domains say about themselves to the rest of the internet. domain mail authentication →
Step 3
What your domains say about themselves
Missing or weak SPF, DKIM and DMARC records raise the risk that someone can impersonate a domain in mail, and can affect whether the domain’s own mail is delivered. Exploit Hound checks what each domain actually publishes, and where it hosts the DNS, publishes what is missing.
- 1The record type, not just the name
A wildcard DNS record makes every name under a domain resolve, so anything asking “does this exist” gets a yes while the record itself is absent. This asks for the record.
- 2It will not invent a DKIM key
The key belongs to the mail server that signs the mail. One that does not match makes signatures fail rather than be missing, which is worse than publishing nothing.
- 3Publishing needs the DNS to be ours
Where it is not, the records are still shown, marked as something the domain’s own operator has to add.
Next: the findings on those assets, each carrying the evidence it was raised from. findings and evidence →
Step 4
Findings with the evidence attached
Every finding carries what was observed, how confident the platform is, and the remediation that closes it.
- 1Severity and risk
Severity is the raw signal; the Exploit Hound risk score is the prioritized one.
- 2Affected asset
Which system, so the finding is actionable rather than abstract.
Next: how those findings connect, which is where a list stops being a list. attack paths →
Step 5
See how exposures connect
Individual findings become routes. A path is labeled potential unless evidence supports something stronger — we do not call a path exploited because it exists.
- 1Active paths
Routes currently present in the graph, and how many reach critical systems.
- 2Confidence label
Potential, high confidence, observed — never conflated.
- 3Choke points
Where one fix removes the most routes.
Next: the ranking that comes out of those paths — which single change removes the most of them. Fix First →
Step 6
One ranked list of what to do
Findings grouped into the actions a person actually performs, ranked by what each removes.
- 1Recommended actions
The work, not the finding count.
- 2Modeled attack paths
How many routes the graph holds right now, which is what a prediction is counted against.
- 3Est. share of modeled path risk
A share of the modeled path risk, with the count and its denominator underneath. Not a reduction in total exposure.
Next: doing one, and finding out whether it worked. verification →
Step 7
Prove the fix, then watch for drift
Remediation is not the end of the loop. Targeted rechecks confirm the exposure is gone, and change detection surfaces what moved since.
- 1Window
Added, removed, worsened and improved over a period you choose.
- 2What changed
New exposure is what deserves attention; a month-old unchanged finding is not news.
Next: the identity side, where a cloud account can undo a network fix. Entra identity →
Step 8
Cloud identity, read-only
Microsoft Entra ID assessed through read-only Graph permissions, shown with what each permission is for before anything is granted.
- 1Consent is informed
The exact permissions, what each reads, and what goes unassessed without it — above the form, before anything is created.
- 2Gaps are shown as gaps
Conditional Access and risk detections here were not assessed: one permission was never granted, the other needs a licence this tenant does not have. An unchecked area is not a clean result.
- 3Read-only by design
Not one write permission is requested, so a compromise of this platform cannot modify a customer’s directory.
Next: sending an approved action to the RMM the technician already uses. RMM remediation →
Entra ID exposure, with its coverage gaps stated
Step 9
Approved remediation, through your RMM
Named actions from a fixed catalogue, executed on devices matched confidently enough to act on.
- 1A catalogue, not a script
Exploit Hound submits named actions. It cannot send a script of its own to a tool that runs as SYSTEM on every endpoint.
- 2Device matching shows its evidence
“Matched on serial 5CG9284XYZ” is checkable. A weaker match needs a person to confirm it before anything runs.
- 3Approval is opted into
The default is that nothing runs unattended. Saving credentials is not the act that authorises changing machines.
Next: the part that matters — the RMM says it ran, and this checks whether the exposure is gone. proof of fix →
RMM remediation with device mappings and their evidence
Step 10
Then prove the exposure is gone
The RMM reporting success is not evidence. After an action completes the findings are re-probed and the exposure graph recalculated.
- 1Measured, not estimated
14 attack paths no longer appear in the recomputed graph, measured against a baseline captured when the work was submitted.
- 2Partial stays partial
Two findings confirmed resolved, one still present, one endpoint failed. The ticket stays open and the failed endpoint keeps its finding.
- 3Unverifiable is not fixed
Anything that could not be re-checked is reported as unverified rather than counted as resolved.
Next: what all of this adds up to against a framework, including what it cannot see. CMMC readiness →
A verified remediation result, including what failed
Step 11
Readiness, including what it cannot see
CMMC technical readiness across the requirements this platform can evidence — and, at least as prominently, the ones it cannot.
- 1The largest number first
89 of 110 requirements are not assessable by a vulnerability platform, and that is the largest figure on the page.
- 2Four states, not three
A requirement with no findings only passes if we actually assess it. Where our evidence cannot complete one, it says what a human must supply.
- 3Never a certification
The disclaimer sits directly above any status.
Next: the same picture across every customer at once. the MSP console →
CMMC technical readiness, with its coverage stated
Step 12
Every customer in one console
Built for running security across many environments, with tenant isolation enforced at the query layer rather than by convention.
- 1Per-customer posture
Each environment scored on the same methodology, so they are comparable.
- 2Where to spend today
Cross-customer view of what is most urgent.
That is the tour. The demonstration environment is invented; the interface is the running application. ask for a walkthrough →
What happens to a finding
Nothing quietly disappears
Four of these are the answers people expect a security tool to hide, so it is worth being specific about what each one does to the record.
Accepted risk
Somebody decided to live with it, and that decision is recorded with who made it. The finding stays open in the data and stops appearing in the work queue. A later scan that sees it again does not reopen it or count it as new — it counts it as seen and suppressed, so a scan that met it does not look identical to one that did not.
False positive
Marked by a person, not inferred. The finding is excluded from scoring and from Fix First, and the signature is remembered so the same detection on the same asset does not come back as new next week. It remains readable: a false-positive decision that turns out to be wrong needs to be findable.
Partial verification
The re-check ran and could not reach everything it needed to. That is reported as unverified rather than as fixed, and the ticket stays open on the part that could not be checked. A remediation that worked on nine endpoints and failed on the tenth is not a remediation that worked.
Reopened
A verified fix that a later scan finds again. The finding reopens with its history attached rather than starting over, so the record shows it was fixed, when, and that it came back — which is the sequence somebody needs when a change keeps getting undone.
Start with what's actually exposed.
Point Exploit Hound at the assets you are authorized to assess and see the connected picture, ranked by what removes the most exposure.